Abstract. We study definability of second-order generalized quantifiers. We show that the question whether a second-order generalized quantifier Q 1 is definable in terms of another quantifier Q 2 , the base logic being monadic second-order logic, reduces to the question if a quantifier Q 1 is definable in FO(Q 2 , <, +, ×) for certain first-order quantifiers Q 1 and Q 2 . We use our characterization to show new definability and nondefinability results for second-order generalized quantifiers. In particular, we show that the monadic second-order majority quantifier Most 1 is not definable in second-order logic.
Introduction
The notion of generalized quantifier goes back to Mostowski [1] and Lindström [2] . Generalized quantifiers were first mainly studied in the framework of model theory. The study of generalized quantifiers extended to the context of finite model theory via applications to descriptive complexity theory. We refer to [3] and [4] for surveys of first-order generalized quantifiers in finite model theory. Generalized quantifiers have been also extensively studied in the formal semantics of natural language (see [5] for a survey).
The study of second-order generalized quantifiers is a relatively new and unexplored area in finite model theory. On the other hand, second-order logic (SO) and its many fragments have been studied extensively starting from Fagin's characterization of NP in terms of existential second-order logic [6] . Second-order generalized quantifiers were first studied in the context of finite structures by Burtschick and Vollmer [7] . Shortly after, Andersson [8] studied the expressive power of families of second-order generalized quantifiers determined by the syntactic types of quantifiers. In [9, 10, 11] Kontinen studied definability questions of second-order generalized quantifiers. In the case of first-order quantifiers, definability of a quantifier Q in a logic L means that the class of structures, used to interpret Q, is axiomatizable in L. In the second-order case, the analogous
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concept of definability was formulated in [9, 10] . In this article, we give a computationally motivated characterization for the notion of definability of second-order generalized quantifiers.
Burtschick and Vollmer [7] noticed that second-order generalized quantifiers can be used to logically characterize complexity classes defined in terms of socalled Leaf Languages. The leaf languages approach in computational complexity theory, introduced by Bovet, Crescenzi, and Silvestri [12] , is a unifying approach to define complexity classes. The central idea behind this approach is to generalize the conditions under which, e.g., a Turing machine or an automaton accepts its input. Many complexity classes can be defined in this context in terms of suitable leaf languages. On the other hand, a complexity class defined in terms of a leaf language B can be under certain conditions characterized logically in terms of a logic of the form:
where Q B is a second-order generalized quantifier corresponding to the language B. In the context of leaf languages, polynomial time non-deterministic Turing machines can be sometimes replaced by non-deterministic finite automata (socalled finite leaf automata) without a significant increase in complexity [13] . Galota and Vollmer [14] showed that complexity classes defined in terms of finite leaf automata can be logically characterized in terms of monadic secondorder generalized quantifiers. This result nicely extends the well known [15, 16, 17] characterization of regular languages in terms of monadic second-order logic (MSO). The definability theory of second-order generalized quantifiers has some similarities and differences compared to that of first-order generalized quantifiers. For example, it was observed in [9] that the binary second-order existential quantifier cannot be defined in terms of any monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. This result is in contrast with fact (a corollary of a result of Andersson [8] ) that all classes of finite first-order structures are already definable in terms of monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. In this paper we prove a general result characterizing the question when a quantifier Q is definable in MSO(Q , +), where + denotes the built-in addition relation. We assume the built-in addition in order to unleash the expressive power embodied by MSO. Recall that, while MSO corresponds to regular languages over strings, MSO(+) corresponds to the linear fragment of the polynomial hierarchy (LINH) on strings [18] . It is possible to formulate our characterization also in the case where the base logic is full second-order logic instead of MSO(+).
Our characterization is based on a logical formalization of an idea of Torán [19] . Torán studied oracle separations in the counting hierarchy and noticed that there is essentially no difference between an oracle Turing machine writing an oracle query on its query tape and a logarithmic time Turing machine writing an address on its random access tape. He used this analogy to show that an oracle separation result for classes in the polynomial counting hierarchy implies a real separation for the corresponding classes in the logarithmic counting hierarchy LINCH (equivalently in DLOGTIME-uniform TC 0 ). We show that a second-order generalized quantifier Q 1 is definable in the logic MSO(Q 2 , +) iff for certain first-order encodings Q i of Q i , Q 1 is definable in FO(Q 2 , +, ×). It is worth noting that the latter condition implies that Q 1 is AC 0 (Turing) reducible to Q 2 . We use our characterization to show new definability and non-definability results for second-order generalized quantifiers. In particular, we show that the monadic second-order majority quantifier Most 1 is not definable in second-order logic. This aswers the question left open in [20] (see also [21] ), where second-order generalized quantifiers were used to model collective quantification in natural language. For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss the role and use of quantifiers in formal semantics in this paper.
Preliminaries
In this article all structures are assumed to be finite. The universe of a structure A is denoted by A. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A is always of the form {0, . . . , m} for some m ∈ N. For a logic L, the set of τ -formulas of L is denoted by L[τ ]. If φ is a τ -sentence, then the class of τ -models of φ is denoted by Mod(φ). A class K of τ -models is said to be axiomatizable in a logic L, if
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N and N * denotes the set N \ {0}.
Sometimes we assume that our structures (and logics) are equipped with auxiliary built-in relations. In addition to the built-in ordering <, which is interpreted naturally, we also use the ternary relations + and ×. The relations + and × are defined as
The relation BIT is a further important relation which is defined by: BIT(a, j) holds iff the bit of order 2 j is 1 in the binary representation bin(a) of a. The presence of built-in relations is signalled, e.g., by the notation FO(<). It is well known that FO(<, +, ×) ≡ FO(<, BIT) (see [22] ). Note that < is easily definable in FO(+) and hence, in the precence of +, we sometimes do not mention < explicitely.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of computational complexity theory. Below, we recall certain results from descriptive complexity theory. It is instructive to note that many of the logics considered in this article correspond to interesting complexity classes. We mention first the logic FO(<, +, ×) which corresponds exactly to the so-called logarithmic hierarchy (LH). This class is the logarithmic analogue of the polynomial hierarchy (PH), corresponding to SO [23] , defined in terms of alternating Turing machines (ATM) running in polynomial time with O(1) alternations. In between LH and PH we have the linear hierarchy (LINH) corresponding to the logic MSO(+) over strings [18] .
In this article also majority quantifiers are dicussed and studied. It is wellknown that majority quantifiers can be used to logically characterize counting computations. The following counting hierarchies are relevant for this article: the logarithmic counting hierarchy (LCH), the linear counting hierarchy (LINCH), and the (polynomial) counting hierarchy (CH) all of which can be defined, with analogous resource bounds as LH, LINH, and PH, in terms of so-called Threshold Turing machines [24] . On the logical side, majority quantifiers (defined in Section 2.1) can be used to provide logical counterparts for these classes: FO(M, +, ×) ≡ LCH [25] , FO(Most 1 , <) ≡ LINCH (over strings) [26] , and FO(Most k ) k∈N * ≡ CH [27] . Furthermore, in circuit complexity, it is known that LH corresponds exactly to DLOGTIME-uniform AC 0 and LCH to DLOGTIME-uniform TC 0 [25] . Also, DLOGTIME-uniform
Generalized quantifiers
In this section we briefly recall some basics of generalized quantifiers.
Let τ = {P 1 , . . . , P r } be a relational vocabulary, where P i is l i -ary for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and Q a class of τ -structures closed under isomorphisms. The class Q gives rise to a generalized quantifier which we also denote by Q. The tuple s = (l 1 , . . . , l r ) is the type of the quantifier Q. Definition 1. The extension FO(Q) of first-order logic by a quantifier Q is defined as follows:
1. The formula formation rules of FO are extended by the rule: if for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, φ i (x i ) is a formula and x i is an l i -tuple of pairwise distinct variables then Qx 1 , . . . , x r (φ 1 (x 1 ), . . . , φ r (x r )) is a formula. 2. The satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:
where φ
We say that a quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if the class Q is axiomatizable in L. Note that Q is trivially definable in FO(Q). If L has the substitution property and is closed under FO-operations, then definability of Q in L implies that FO(Q) ≤ L. So, among such logics, FO(Q) is the minimal logic in which Q is definable. Example 1. The following quantifiers will be discussed in the following sections. Suppose S ⊆ N and k ∈ N.
If S is of the form {kn | n ∈ N} for some k ∈ N, we denote Q S by D k .
We will also refer to the vectorizations of the quantifiers D k and M later. The nth vectorization of D k is the following quantifier
n and |P | = 0 mod k}, and the nth vectorization of M is
Let us then turn to second-order generalized quantifiers. Let t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ), where
is a tuple of positive integers for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. A secondorder structure of type t is a structure of the form (A, P 1 , . . . , P w ), where
Definition 2. A second-order generalized quantifier Q of type t is a class of structures of type t such that Q is closed under isomorphisms.
A quantifier
Analogously to the first-order case, if S is of the form {kn | n ∈ N} for some k ∈ N, we denote Q S by D k .
The first example is the familiar k-ary second-order existential quantifier. The quantifier Even says that a formula holds for an even number of subsets of the universe. On the other hand, the quantifier Even says that all the subsets satisfying a formula have an even cardinality. The quantifier Most k is the k-ary second-order version of M expressing that a formula holds for more than half of the k-ary relations.
Definition 3. The extension FO(Q) of FO by a quantifier Q is defined as follows:
1. The formula formation rules of FO are extended by the rule: if for 1 ≤ i ≤ w, φ i (X i ) is a formula and X i = (X 1,i , . . . , X ri,i ) is a tuple of pairwise distinct predicate variables such that the arity of X j,i is l
is a formula. 2. Satisfaction relation of FO is extended by the rule:
Definability
Recall that a first-order generalized quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if the class Q is axiomatizable in L. This condition can be reformulated as follows assuming L has the substitution property:
How do we formalize definability for second-order quantifiers? Intuitively, e.g., the monadic second-order existential quantifier ∃ 2 1 is definable in a logic L if there is a uniform way to express
for any formula ψ(X) in the logic L. Over a model A, ψ(X) defines a collection of subsets {C ⊆ A | A |= ψ(C)}, so the problem is to find a way to express the non-emptyness of this collection in a way which does not depend on the particular formula ψ(X). This was formalized in [10] using second-order relations.
Definition 4. Let L be a logic, t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ) a second-order type, and let G 1 , . . . , G w be first-order quantifier symbols of types s 1 , . . . , s w .
1. The logic L(G 1 , . . . , G w ) is obtained by extending the syntax of L in terms of the quantifiers G 1 , . . . , G w . 2. The models of L(G 1 , . . . , G w ) are of the form A = (A, G 1 , . . . , G w ), where A is a first-order model and
3. The quantifiers G i are interpreted using the relations G i :
corresponds to a second-order generalized quantifier of type t. This observation can be used to formalize definability of second-order generalized quantifiers. Below, we assume that L is closed under substitution.
Definition 5. Let Q be a quantifier of type t. The quantifier Q is definable in a logic L if there is φ ∈ L(G 1 , . . . , G w ) of vocabulary σ = ∅ such that for any t-structure (A, G 1 , . . . , G w ),
The following was shown in [10] :
The converse of Theorem 2 does not hold:
Theorem 3 ([10]
). There is a quantifier Q of type ( (1)) which is not definable in FO and satisfies FO ≡ FO(Q).
Definability questions of second-order quantifiers has been studied in [10, 11, 27] . We recall the following results.
Theorem 4 ([11]
). Let t be type and B t the collection of all second-order quantifiers of types less than t. Then there is a quantifier Q of type t such that Q is not definable in SO(B t ).
Theorem 4 is proved with respect to a natural ordering of the types of secondorder generalized quantifiers. Theorem 4 is existential in nature and does not give us a concrete non-definable quantifier. It was observed in [9] that it is not so difficult to find concrete quantifiers which cannot be defined using any monadic quantifiers. Denote by Q the collection of all monadic second-order generalized quantifiers.
Theorem 5 ([9]). The quantifier ∃ 2 2 is not definable in FO(Q).
It is worth noting that the logic FO(Q) is capable of defining all classes of firstorder structures (cf. Theorem 6.2 in [8] ). Finally, we recall the following result about second-order majority quantifiers:
It interesting to note that definability of Most 1 in the logic SO would imply that PH ≡ CH in computational complexity. This observation was discussed in [20] . In this paper we show that the quantifier Most 1 is not definable in SO, but, analogously to Theorem 3, this non-definability result does not imply that PH CH.
Characterizing definability
The computational analogue of a first-order generalized quantifier is the notion of an oracle (see [22] ). Let Q be a quantifier of vocabulary τ and L a logic. The idea is that in L(Q) we can query "without a cost" if a definable τ -structure A is a member of the class Q. Recall that a second-order generalized quantifier Q of type ( (1)) is definable, e.g., in SO if there is a sentence φ ∈ SO(G) such that for all second-order structures (A, G):
It is not immediately clear how to view this notion in computational terms. The set G corresponds to a local first-order quantifier and, if we treat G as an oracle, then in (1) we are infact trying to define a property oracles. One way to proceed is to formalize definability of a quantifier Q in terms of oracle Turing machines that treat (a suitable initial segment) the oracle as part of the input. However, in this article we do not follow that idea as there is a more familiar route to take. An important observation here is that the set G can be of exponential size compared to the domain A. This observation can be used to show that SO-definability of Q reduces to logarithmic time definability. Our proof is based on a logical version of an idea of Torán [19] showing that there is essentially no difference between an oracle Turing machine writing an oracle query on its query tape, and a logarithmic time Turing machine writing an address on its random access tape. In other words, an oracle in the setting of polynomial time machines can be viewed as an input to a logarithmic time machine. We use a logical version of this idea: we show that SO and the relation G in (1) can be replaced by FO and a unary relation P by passing from A to a domain of cardinality 2
|A| . In this section we mainly restrict attention to monadic second-order generalized quantifiers. We interpret definability of quantifiers in logics with built-in relations in the natural way. For example, a second-order quantifier Q of type ( (1)) is definable in MSO(+) if there is φ ∈ MSO(G, +) such that for all structures (A, +, G): (A, +, G) |= φ ⇔ (A, G) ∈ Q. In particular, Theorem 2 can be proved analogously in this setting.
Next we define a first-order encoding of a second-order structure of type t, for a monadic t. We use the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between integers m ∈ B = {0, . . . , 2 n − 1} and subsets of A = {0, . . . , n − 1} seen as length-n binary numbers. Therefore, relations of A can be encoded in terms of tuples of elements of B and, further, sets of relations of A by relations of B.
Definition 6. Let t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ) be a type where s i = (1, . . . , 1) is of length r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ w. Let A = (A, G 1 , . . . , G w ) be a t-structure where A = {0, . . . , n−1} and G i ⊆ P(A) × · · · × P(A). Denote byÂ = (B, P 1 , . . . , P w ) the following firstorder structure of vocabulary τ = {P 1 , . . . , P w }, where P i is a r i -ary predicate, and
For a quantifier Q of type t, we denote by Q the first-order quantifier of vocabulary τ defined by Q := {Â : A ∈ Q}.
Note that the quantifier Q has only structures in cardinalities of the form 2 n and that
We are now ready for the main result of this article (see the Appendix for the proof).
Theorem 7. Let Q 1 and Q 2 be monadic quantifiers. Then Q 1 is definable in MSO(Q 2 , +) if and only if Q 1 is definable in FO(Q 2 , +, ×).
Let us then discuss some corollaries of Theorem 7. We need the following definition.
Definition 7. Let t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ) and τ be as in Definition 6. Let Q be a quantifier of type t. The quantifier Q is numerical if there is a relation T ⊆ N w such that for all t-structures (A, P 1 , . . . , P w ) (A, P 1 , . . . , P w ) ∈ Q ⇔ (|P 1 |, . . . , |P w |) ∈ T.
We denote Q by Q T and by Q T the first-order numerical quantifier (defined analogously) of vocabulary τ .
It is easy to see that, for a numerical Q T , the quantifier Q T (see Definition 6) is just the restriction of the corresponding first-order quantifier Q T to the cardinalities 2 n :
This observation allows us to show the following (see the Appendix for the proof):
Theorem 8. Let Q T be a numerical quantifier and k ∈ N. Then
The following lemma can be now used. Proof. The first claim follows from non-definability of the language PARITY in FO(+, ×) [28, 29] (see Theorem 4.3 in [30] ). The second claim goes back to [31] .
By combining Theorem 8 and Lemma 1 we can show the following.
Corollary 1. Let S ⊆ N, p a prime, and q > 1 relatively prime to p. Then
It is possible to replace MSO(+) by SO in Theorem 7. The idea is that, if Q 1 is definable in SO(Q 2 ), then in the defining formula, for some k, only relations of arity at most k are quantified. We do not present this generalization in detail in this article but only consider the special case of the quantifier Most 1 . ×) . This contradicts the result of [28, 29] . In order to translate the quantifier ∃ 2 k to the logic FO(+, ×), we redefine the structureÂ (see Definition 6) to have a domain of the form {0, . . . , 2 n k −1}. Now we can use the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between integers m ∈ {0, . . . , 2 n k − 1} and k-ary relations R of {0, . . . , n − 1}. In other words, by using the lexicographic ordering on k-tuples, a relation R can be encoded by a binary string of length n k corresponding to the binary representation of a unique integer m < 2 n k . It is straightforward to adjust the translation in the proof of Theorem 7 to this setting.
Conclusion
We have shown that definability of second-order generalized quantifiers can be reduced to definability of first-order generalized quantifiers. We have indicated a couple of corollaries to our characterization but surely there is more to be done here. Also, as discussed in connection to Theorem 9, it is possible to replace MSO in terms of SO and to prove a result analogous to Theorem 7 in this case. In particular, Theorem 9 solves the open problem proposed in [20] , where we studied the collective meanings of natural language quantifiers. It suggests, as we argued in [20] , that the type-shifting strategy [32] to define the meanings of natural language quantification might be too restricted in its computational power. It is likely that second-order logic is not enough to capture natural language semantics. Another interpretation would be that everyday language does not realize hard collective quantifiers (for sure they are marginal at best) due to their complexity. where the assignment s * is defined such that s * (x i ) = s(x i ) for all first-order variables x i , and, if s(Y i ) = D ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1}, then s * (y i ) is the unique d < 2 n whose binary representation is given by s 0 · · · s n−1 where s j = 1 ⇐⇒ j ∈ D.
In the formula translation, we use the predicate BIT, which is FO(+, ×)-definable, to recover the set D from the integer d. By the above translation, the sentence ∃n(|B| = 2 n ∧ φ * )
of the logic FO(Q 2 , +, ×) now defines the quantifier Q 1 . Let us then show the converse implication. Assume that φ ∈ FO(Q 2 , +, ×) defines the quantifier Q 1 . The idea is now to translate φ ∈ FO(Q 2 , +, ×) to φ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +) such that for all A = (A, G):
(A, +, G) |= φ ⇔ (B, P, <, +, ×) |= φ.
Analogously to the first translation, we encode integers in the domain B = {0, . . . , 2 n − 1} in terms of subsets X ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1}. We use the following formulas X = Y , X < Y , X + Y = Z, and X × Y = Z expressing arithmetic operations on binary numbers. The first three formulas are FO(+)-expressible, and the fourth is expressible in the logic FO(M, +, ×) ≤ MSO(+) [33] . The translation φ φ is now defined as follows.
P (x i , x j ) Gz 1 , z 2 (X i (z 1 ), X j (z 2 ))
It is straightforward to show that this translation works as intended. In particular, it follows that the sentence φ ∈ MSO(Q 2 , G, +) now defines the quantifier Q 1 .
Proof (of Theorem 8).
The proof is based on the fact that each of the logics FO(<, +, ×), FO(D k , +, ×), and FO(M, +, ×) is closed under logical reductions. Suppose that Q T is of type t = (s 1 , . . . , s w ) and let τ denote the vocabulary of the corresponding first-order quantifier Q T (see Definition 6). Let us consider claim 2. By Theorem 7 it suffices to show that the following are equivalent:
